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In this essay, my aim is to clear some ground for thinking about global ethics from an 
anarchist point of view. With one or two exceptions (Falk 1978, 2010, Weiss 1975, 
Gaby 2008, Prichard 2013), anarchism has had no voice in academic debates about 
the means and ends of global justice, even though broad swaths of the global justice 
movement is today at least anarchistic in political orientation (Epstein 2001, Graeber 
2013).1 This relative absence in academic circles is almost certainly partly due to the 
association of anarchy with the theory of the state of nature in IR and political theory, 
as well as general misconceptions about anarchism as an ideology.  
In relation to the former, Thomas Nagel’s view is fairly typical. For him, “the 
path from anarchy to justice must go through injustice” (Nagel 2005: 147). Following 
a broadly secular theodicy, of the sort we see in thinkers from Hobbes to Kant and 
                                                        
1 What passes as anarchism in contemporary political theory and ethics, philosophical 
anarchism and/or libertarianism, is not really anarchism at all. I do not have the space 
to set out the terms of this debate here and will simply say that it has been done 
perfectly well elsewhere by Nathan Jun (2016), Magda Egoumenides (2014), and Paul 
McLoughlin (2010).  
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beyond, our human failings are the means through which we have to negotiate a 
philosophical and epochal shift from barbarism to civility. This association of anarchy 
with barbarism is typical, but a definitional choice that betrays a number of 
Eurocentric biases, from the association of anti-state, anti-proprietarian and anti-
sedentary social orders with backwardness (Scott 2009, Krasner 2011, Jahn 2000), to 
philosophies of history that presumed that the success of European civilization would 
necessarily emerge out of conflict with the uncivilized rest (Behnke 2008, Keene 
2002). Bringing state-like order to the former, and resolving the latter in similar 
fashion, is at the heart of variations of the ‘domestic analogy’, replete within a range 
of world state theories to this day (e.g., Albert et al 2012).  
However, there are other ways of understanding the concept of anarchy, and 
these can be found in the anarchist tradition, better remembered on the street than in 
the academy, consequently rarely discussed in political theory or IR, let alone global 
ethics. This conceptual recovery is underway elsewhere and promises to revive debate 
around a central but remarkably uncontested concept in political science as well as IR 
(Alker 1996, Prichard 2016, Havercroft and Prichard 2017). In this chapter I want to 
set out how the concept of anarchy, as used by anarchists, might help reshape how we 
approach global ethics.  
To do this, I have structured the chapter in three parts. In part one I reclaim the 
concept of anarchy, central to anarchist politics, from the mainstream IR usage. In 
particular, I wish to show how, with an anarchist inflection, the concept of anarchy 
becomes radical and emancipatory in anarchist hands. In part two I deploy this 
reformulation of the concept of anarchy to engage standard questions in the study of 
global ethics. In part three I consider three objections, from the left, to this anarchist 
praxis: first that contemporary anarchism is an individualist protest movement not a 
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coherent politics. Secondly, that the anarchist rejection of the state makes it 
democratically illegitimate. Finally, that anarchist anti-representationalism makes it 
practically useless in a globalised world. Each of these is connected and presents a 
powerful objection to anarchism. Responding to these criticisms is central to 
underpinning the ethical credentials of anarchism. I conclude by making the case for 
an anarchist theory of anarchy to help reorient thinking about global ethics.  
 
Anarchy and Global Ethics: from International Relations to Anarchism 
 
To think about ethics from an anarchist point of view demands we reclaim the 
concept of anarchy from mainstream and normative International Relations (IR) 
theory. After all, if anarchists are not defenders of anarchy, then the moniker is a 
misnomer at the very least. The problem is that in IR, thinking ethically about world 
politics, or thinking about ethics in world politics, has generally started from a 
rejection of anarchy. Typically, anarchy is understood as synonymous with a state of 
nature and the antithesis of the social contract, something which the modern state 
releases us from. In much hackneyed realist IR theory, the key reference point is 
Hobbes, though this association has recently and rightly been overturned (Grewal 
2016, Christov 2013, Armitage 2013). 
Late twentieth century IR theory presents the international system as an 
anarchy. Anarchy emerges out of the material scarcity and threats that arises from the 
co-action of sovereign states, themselves having resolved the problem of anarchy 
within. In this secondary realm of a well-ordered commonwealth, anarchy imposes 
limits and conditions on state behaviour instead. In the strongest articulations of this 
view, anarchy forces us to act with a tragic disregard for ethics.  
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This presumption of anarchy is also central to the positivist approach to world 
politics, which takes anarchy as one three analytical starting points (the others being 
rationality and state actorness), and from this reasons that the methods of IR can be 
value free on the basis of this prior empirical/conceptual assumption about world 
politics (e.g., Kydd 2015: 2). But this view of the world cannot be value free, 
precisely because the description of the state and of anarchy is always already a moral 
normative claim about how we ought to organise. Anarchy is not an empirical feature 
of the world. Rather it is a theoretical idea, a concept, that involves a complex set of 
normative assumptions about how we ought to live (see Prichard 2016 for more). In 
other words, positivist IR is only possible on the basis that the prior assumptions 
about the normative and ethical foundations of world politics have already been 
settled, which they have not, of course.  
More progressivist readings of world politics, however, do not differ 
substantially from this general tendency. English School theorists and neo-Kantian 
critical theorists, many of whom are cosmopolitans too (e.g., Linklater 1998), foresee 
a future beyond the state, or envision a system of global governance with features 
more or less like a world state (Held 1995. For an important set of criticisms from 
within the cosmopolitan tradition see Brown 2012). Marxist and liberal readings of 
history are most common here, seeing anarchy as either a first step, or a stepping 
stone to a better world beyond.  
If we are to develop an anarchist ethics for IR, then we need to rethink the 
moral value of the concept of anarchy. There is some precedent here, but it is hardly 
anarchist. For example, Hedley Bull (1977), Kenneth Waltz (1962, 1979) and Mervyn 
Frost (2009), have each sought to demonstrate the virtues of anarchy for guaranteeing 
the freedom of peoples in international politics (for a good discussion see Lechner 
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2017). All three defend an understanding of the international community of states as 
one structured around the prior normative value of sovereignty. Anarchy is a virtue 
precisely because it permits and formalizes the structural and normative framework 
for different conceptions of the good to be pursued within sovereign states without 
interference from outside.  
Bull draws from Burke and H. L. A. Hart, Waltz draws on Durkheim and 
Kant, and Frost from Hegel and Nozick. All three share a liberal vision of anarchy as 
consecrating a zone of non-interference within states, which provides the basis for 
pursuing the good and grounding ethical claims against others. There is no question 
that these conceptions of the good defend particular, parochial, European accounts of 
the good. This led Bull to famously prefer order over justice, most tellingly in his 
rejection of the anti-Apartheid campaign in South Africa. For Waltz, the pressures of 
self-help forced development, which led to functional differentiation and thus the 
moral autonomy of political community. This led him to defend nuclear proliferation 
on the basis that modernization and development was an inevitable by-product of 
developing nuclear weapons (Waltz 1990).  
Frost argues that there are two anarchies in contemporary international 
politics, not one, with an anarchy of civil society overlaying the anarchical society of 
states. The UN Declaration of Human Rights transforms the world’s population into 
rights holders against their states. While this is a development on the statism of Bull 
and Waltz, the two anarchies are mutually reinforcing. Moreover, they are reinforcing 
of a very specific type of political subjectivity, one premised on the possession of 
rights in one’s self, and the right to alienate those rights, whether for employment or 
to the state.  
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There is then, in IR, a small but important tradition of thinking about ethics 
from within the conceptual discourse of anarchy. But this is a highly contentious and 
contested set of debates and of course no less ideological than any anarchist 
alternative (Freeden 1996, Prichard 2017b). And yet, these ideologies of anarchy have 
proceeded with no engagement with anarchism whatsoever. 
Anarchism, arguably the only political philosophy of anarchy, emerged in the 
mid-nineteenth century at precisely the time the modern nation state was born 
(Prichard 2013). Anarchists rejected the centralizing and dominating institutional 
forms the modern state took, and the commodification of work and society that 
emerged as a consequence of the rise of capitalism and the transformation of chattel 
slavery into wage slavery. For anarchists, the functional integration promised by 
Auguste Comte, the father of sociology, and later Durkheim and others, argued for the 
hierarchical submission of individuals to an unaccountable scientific elite within a 
determined hierarchical state. In Comte’s fantastic utopia, a legion of Priest Scientists 
was destined to rule, and total obedience to them was demanded by the providential 
unfurling of history that led them to the pinnacle of society. This philosophy was only 
slightly more insane than the prevailing ideas about monarchy, the rights of the 
emerging bourgeoisie, or Europe more generally.  
Anarchists were primarily anti-capitalist who rejected the idea of private 
property. The establishment of private property, much like state sovereignty, 
developed out of the logic and practice of slavery (Proudhon 1994). Under slavery 
and colonialism, property was held directly in another. Under sovereignty and private 
property regimes, title had to be alienable, first to the state, then to the capitalist. The 
conceit then was that the demand for self-ownership prefaced the need for this to be 
alienated such that title in the self and other things could be commodified and 
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exchanged. As Anthony Anghie (2005) has shown, the mandate system of colonial 
administration in the nineteenth century was a testing ground for developing these 
theories of sovereignty, a development anarchists saw taking place within the 
emerging nation states too, usually to the detriment of innumerable minority ethnic 
and cultural groups (Holland 2010). Likewise, the development of a system of 
alienable property in the self was central to the development of wage labour and 
liberal conceptions of rights (Proudhon 1994, Bakunin 1964: 187. Cf. Gourevitch 
2011).  
Nineteenth century anarchists drew on the republican tradition to 
conceptualize personality and freedom differently, and in so doing developed an 
alternative theory of anarchy. The primary focus was freedom from domination and 
oppression, rather than freedom as independence. Slavery was a paradigm case of 
unfreedom, where ones actions could be arbitrarily curtailed because there was no 
constitutional provision restricting the actions of the powerful. Anarchists rejected the 
idea that states could decide the terms of this constitutional provision unilaterally and 
without participation from the masses, and argued that universal suffrage would 
merely embed this oligarchic tendency rather than curtail it (cf. Michels 1968). For 
anarchists, to be a fully free individual meant to be an active and undominated 
participant in society, with the opportunity for full participation in collectively 
deliberating and taking the decisions likely to affect you and your family or 
associates. This form of radical democracy was labelled anarchy or anarchism, 
precisely because it rejected any final point of authority, not because anarchists 
demanded a voluntarist society without rules (Graeber 2013, Maekelbergh 2009).  
Active participation was impossible, anarchists argued, within the structure of 
the modern state and capitalism, hence the demand to break both up into an infinite 
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plurality of parts, then re-federating them according to a principle of subsidiarity and 
horizontality. In relation to property, this meant the negotiation and commutation of 
title, such that property met commutative (negotiated) ends rather than individual or 
collective desires alone, for example via worker, producer, or property cooperatives. 
This negotiated title stands in stark contrast to private title, and the notion that 
democracy might be participatory contrasts quite starkly with the representative 
system that dominates mainstream institutions. But we need to see anarchy as a 
normative principle too, because in so far as defending this plurality demanded an 
institutional framework that would defend this variety, the benchmark was anarchy, 
that is the absence of a final point of authority. Only in systems in which finality was 
absent, and subsidiarity defended, could freedom to change and reject the terms of 
association be guaranteed. 
 This brief summary no doubt leaves many unanswered questions. But the 
point I wish to drive home here, is that traditional associations of anarchy with 
freedom defend an account of freedom that is associated with property in the self, in 
others, or other things, and defend anarchy as the structural form within which this 
account of freedom is best preserved, with all its attendant statist inequalities. This 
account of anarchy is predicated on a conception of rights that are derived from one’s 
autonomy and self-ownership. Anarchists reject this account of rights and property in 
favour of infinite and plural agreements, where ‘the political centre is everywhere, the 
circumference nowhere’, as Proudhon put it (Proudhon 1865: 182). In the next section 
I explore the implications of this notion of anarchy in relation to three key problems 
in contemporary global ethics: global governance, capitalism and the proper scope of 




The Problems of Global Justice Revisited 
 
What is justice? 
 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s extensive analysis of the historical sociology of justice are 
both the earliest and most extensive in the anarchist canon (Prichard 2013, chapter 4. 
See also Kropotkin 1992), and needless to say almost entirely ignored by both 
anarchists and moral philosophers more generally. Proudhon’s conception of justice 
also emerged out of the European republican tradition, specifically the work of 
Rousseau, but also Kant and Michelet, and further back still, to the writings of 
Aristotle. In short, Proudhon sought to historicize the virtues, and the primary virtue, 
for Proudhon, was justice. In his 200 page, four-volume Magnum opus, De la Justice 
dans la Révolution et dans l’Église (or On Justice in the Revolution and in the 
Church), first published in 1858, Proudhon made the case that justice was immanent 
to society, and to talk in terms of immanence made one “a true anarchist” (Proudhon 
1988: 637). By this, Proudhon meant that struggles over conceptions of the good, and 
the realization of the virtues of justice, took place in concrete historical contexts, and 
were constitutive of them. So far, so hermeneutic, but Proudhon also claimed that our 
conceptions of right and wrong were natural, in so far as they were felt in our gut or 
conscience, and that these feelings were trans historical and universally felt, an innate 
sense of right and wrong that had to be socially mediated (cf. Smith 2002). However, 
he also claimed that women had innate natures that set them apart from men both in 
terms of physical strength, but also intellectual ability, and that their natural place was 
in the private domain, while men were made for the public.  
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Proudhon’s sexism still requires systematic engagement and rebuttal in the 
English language literature, but the point I want to take from Proudhon is that he 
sought to derive justice from both an innate sense of right and wrong, which was 
always shaped by and manifested in concrete historical circumstances. Unlike Kant 
who believed our passions to be “pathological” and reason the only palliative, and 
Charles Fourier, who believed that reason was the “fifth wheel on the cart”, and our 
passions to be the basis of a psychology of freedom, Proudhon saw the antinomy 
between reason and conscience to be a constitutive and generative antinomy of 
morality (de Lubac 1948), by this he meant that it was in the balancing of reason and 
conscience, in a social and material context, that justice was to be found. As a 
consequence, not only were there no transcendent grounds for justice, there was no 
telos to the history of right either. Rather, our innate conceptions of justice, whatever 
they might be, were re-shaped in social contexts, and were only one of many lenses 
through which we would engage concrete historical wrongs. Justice, by this 
conception was always immanent to society. 
In his writings on European constitutionalism and on war and peace, Proudhon 
argued against the idea that there was a necessary telos to right. One example of this 
is war. The “moral phenomenology of war” (Proudhon 1998) showed us that not only 
is right central to the pursuit of war, but that war pervades the iconography of justice 
too: in exceptionally brief terms, consider that the ancients understood the wars 
between the gods to define nature; justice is a set of scales and a sword; we fight for 
what is right; wars are fought to defend social values and to consecrate new ones. But 
the pursuit of war always and everywhere undermined or contravened these virtues, 
and the history of mid-to-late nineteenth century industrialisation suggested to 
Proudhon that future wars would be decidedly barbaric.  
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 What we find in contemporary anarchist praxis is not so far removed from 
what Proudhon championed. From the anarchist perspective, the virtues are 
conceptions of the good that need to be practiced in order to be actualized, with the 
good prefigured in context, not an outcome or a transcendent value (Franks 2010). In 
other words right does not exist independently of human agency. There are no 
transcendent benchmarks for the good, whether deontological or utilitarian. 
Anarchists use the concept of prefiguration to theorise this (van de Sande 2015, 
Gordon forthcoming). For anarchists, means are ends in the making. In other words, 
you cannot divorce the good from our actions that bring it into being. Thus, actions 
which are contrary to our conception of the good, are unlikely to issue in virtuous 
outcomes (see also Franks and Wilson 2010).  
 So, to sum up this first part, justice is immanent to society, so those 
institutions and conceptions of the good that are totalising and a priori are by 
definition illegitimate, because they close down the plurality of conceptions of the 
good and the possibility of their future emergence. Anarchy is a normative value 
precisely because it is permissive of multiple conceptions of the good, and it is critical 
because it can show where existing institutions limit this. It is also communitarian in 
so far as it valorises historical communities, but cosmopolitan in so far as it is post-
statist.  
 
Do our obligations to others cross borders and generations? 
 
What I have argued about the source and context for justice would suggest a deeply 
communitarian account of ethics, one in which immediate communities of belief are 
the only viable locus of justice, where appeals to the good are relative, offering no 
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grounds for cross cultural critique, since it is within community that we can realise 
conceptions of the good. Traditionally, and ironically, this communitarianism is 
conflated with statism, the argument being that shared institutions, like those of the 
modern state, are the only ones capable of galvanising a political community. The 
converse argument is that our political institutions are secondary to our shared moral 
equivalence as individuals, and that a cosmopolitan ethics undergirds a more 
expansive conception of the good. By this latter argument, the institutions of the 
nation state are barriers to realising the good.  
 This framing is problematic for anarchists for three reasons. First, the 
institutions of the nation state have historically been built and defended on the basis 
that they restrict the ability of the people to change the laws. For example, both liberal 
and republican accounts of constitutional democracy presuppose and entrench 
capitalism, putting anti-capitalism beyond constitutional politics (Gill and Cutler 
2015). Secondly, while some anarchists believed that a protean cultural identity was 
given in races, most now argue that nationalism and other forms of cultural identity 
are the products of political power, not its precondition. In other words, peoples are 
made, they do not await discovery (Prichard 2010, Breuilly 1993). Third, while 
cosmopolitans tend towards post-statist ends, the tendency is to universalise liberal 
values and political economy. This is not only a form of cultural imperialism, it is also 
a form of socio-economic imperialism (Springer 2011, Tully 2007).  
But clearly, some institutions are better than others, and not all forms of 
identity are racial. So, for example, revolutionary syndicalist labour unions are both 
internationalist and federal in character, the CNT in Spain or France, for example. 
These have historically acted as a crucible for shared values and ethos, and anti-
capitalist practices beyond and below the state. Likewise, one’s identity as a worker is 
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also a highly significant basis for association, which has historically galvanised 
anarchist labour agitators globally (Levy 2010, Bantman and Berry 2010). This is not 
to say that anarchists do not consider themselves citizens of the world, many probably 
do, but this universalism usually corresponds with a defence of their most immediate 
community in the name of a wider, perhaps global ethic. The point is that the state is 
not the institutional framing for thinking about ethics in world politics and so in many 
respects, the typical binary between communitarian nationalism and cosmopolitianism 
drops away. We are left with a more complex and plural conception of political 
community, one in which anarchy retains a central place, since there is no final point 
of moral identification, and the spurious nature of the initial binary is exposed.  
 
What is the proper institutional arrangement for realizing the good?  
 
The simple answer for anarchists is that there is no ideal institution for realising the 
good. Society changes, as do our conceptions of the good. The problem is that while 
modern capitalism is able to adapt to the changed nature of political community, 
democratic constitutionalism has not. Even where there has been a hugely 
participatory constitutional redraft, such as in Iceland, which prompted in part by the 
catastrophic failings of capitalists, enacting this new constitution has met a 
conservative brick wall (Landemore 2015). The ability of the demos to change the 
conditions of its own association remain severely curtailed by the very thing that is 
supposed to guarantee their own freedoms (for more see Loughlin and Walker 2007).   
Anarchists have taken a twin strategy to counter constitutional politics. The 
first is to criticise existing institutional arrangements, and the second to propose the 
foundations for radical alternatives. The latter strategy shows anarchists to be 
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inveterate experimenters. But as for the first, anarchists have spent the past thirty 
years engaging the injustices of global capitalism, but their arguments are not often 
read as treaties in global ethics. For example, Noam Chomsky’s engagement with the 
post-1945 US imperial order are premised on the simple moral truism of reciprocity, 
that is, what’s permissible for the USA is also permissible for other states, and vice 
versa, or that we ought to live by the values we expect others to live by (Chomsky 
2003). As I have shown above, the ethical theory underpinning this conception of 
moral reciprocity dates back at least to Adam Smith’s Theory of the Moral 
Sentiments, and we find a rearticulation of it in Proudhon’s writings, particularly his 
theory of mutualism and reciprocity.  
Contrast this with Signer’s approach to moral duty: if you can, and it will 
increase happiness overall, you should. For anarchists, the alternative might be 
understood as follows: if all parties want something to go ahead, then it should, and 
the institutional barriers to that ought to be the objects of reflexive critique.  
Our duties are not determined independent of context, but rather emerge from 
it. The most pervasive in recent anarchist writings revolves around questions of 
climate change and ecological collapse. Here, it is argued that the modern state and 
capitalism, synonyms for centralisation and consumerism, have led to the destruction 
of the ecosphere and the narrowing of the meaning of human flourishing to identity 
politics and consumption choices (Bookchin 1986). Communities of fate, whether 
transnational solidarity networks, ranging from the World Social Forum to 
Greenpeace, or solidarity with survivors of natural disasters such as in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina (Crow 2011), face innumerable barriers to the effective change 
they require, most notably the state and capitalism.  
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There have been multiple alternatives. The point to make is that anarchists 
have celebrated the diversity of human communities, have been less concerned with 
the proper form of human community and more with the institutions and practices 
through which it might be realised. Central here has been direct democracy and/or 
anti-representational politics, horizontalism and prefiguration. These key concepts 
manifest in concrete terms, and with obvious caveats, in the municipalist and 
ecologically oriented direct democracy of Murray Bookchin (1987), in the topless 
federalism of the anarcho-syndicalist movement, in the multiple affinity groups, 
communes and other myriad cooperative living experiments that strengthen our 
communities from the ground up. None of these has a monopoly on the good, nor are 
they perfect. That is not the point. Rather they are contextually specific intentional 
communities that respond to real need, collectively, directly and horizontally. It is the 
way that they are constituted that defines them, more so perhaps than their raison 
d’être, and it is this commitment to horizontality, prefiguration and forms of direct 
democracy and consensus, that are perhaps the defining institutional features of all 
anarchist(ic) groups.  
As Magda Egoumenides (2014) has shown in her outstanding book, the 
anarchists have developed powerful tools of critique of modern institutions and robust 
ethical standards against which all institutions can be evaluated, even anarchist ones. 
The point that Egoumenides makes is that no institution is immune from the anarchist 
critique and in the face of such critique, these institutions must justify themselves. 
While in many instances, anarchists would defend general values such as freedom as 
non-domination for example (Pettit 1997), they would disagree with the argument that 
the modern state lives up to this standard. Anarchism is a demanding ideology and 
established institutions carry the burden of proof that they meet anarchist objections. 
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No such debate has ever taken place in either political science or IR, let alone global 
ethics.  
 
How should we understand the problem of distributive justice? 
 
It is worth noting that anarchism and socialism in the mid-nineteenth century 
developed primarily as a critique of the church, not of capitalism as such. The latter 
did not develop into an object of study until much later in the century. The early 
anarchists and social reformers of Europe were therefore as much, if not more 
interested in the moral arguments for distributions of wealth than they were in what 
we now understand as strictly ‘economic’ or material ones. The significance of this is 
that anarchism has throughout its history offered a moral critique of capitalism that 
was almost completely absent in most mainstream, if no less revolutionary left wing 
praxis (see Franks 2012, Choat 2016).  
 The contrast is quite easy to illustrate in simple terms. Where liberal accounts 
of distributive justice prioritise rights and legal means, republican and Marxist ones 
focus on political and institutional ones. The former presupposes the obligations of 
subjects to the law, the latter of the law to subjects. The former seeks an equality of 
opportunity under the law, the latter is more concerned with an equality of outcome. 
Both presuppose a distributing centre that is mandated in some way (law or demos).  
Anarchists take a different path: commutation or exchange relations (Simon 
1987). By this commutative account, distributive justice is achieved through 
negotiation and agreement (for an interesting application of this theory see Walsh and 
Johnson 2016). Multiple relations of commutation, of agreement, can be reached 
between individuals and groups, and consecrated by pacts, contracts or agreements. 
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This commitment to foedus or pacts is what Proudhon took to be the basis of the 
federative theory (Proudhon 1979). 
This approach to economic equity can be seen in a range of different 
experiments from the global cooperative movement, to syndicalism, to traditional gift 
economies (Graeber 2002, 2004, 2011), each of which builds community by 
addressing material inequality. Clive Gabay has argued that this impulse has a 
cosmopolitan dimension in so far as micro exchange relations always overspill their 
localism and have macro implications (Gabay 2008). For example, giving to address 
need, or in order to satisfy a moral imperative, without due attention to the means 
through which aid is distributed, or managed, can do more harm than good. 
Understanding aid relations as exchange relations demands also an engagement with 
the lived practices across that chain, which invariably demands a cosmopolitan 
sensibility, even if the good must always be negotiated. Reconciling community with 
cosmopolis, through processes of equal exchange that empower and build solidarity in 
this way, is an anarchist ethic because it aims to prefigure horizontality, participation 
and the good within social practices. The relations of solidarity that underpin pacts 
such as these are designed to fulfil immediate need and build a global political 
economy from below (Knowles 2004, Falk 1997, Shannon, Nocella, Asimakopoulos 
2012). 
Taking commutation and equal exchange seriously forces us to admit that 
there are no a priori foundations for justice, but also helps us see the conceit at the 
heart of much global ethics. Theories of distributive justice tend to presuppose a 
hierarchy of institutions that are empowered to resolve problems. This, from the 
anarchist point of view, exacerbates the problem. The solution cannot presuppose the 
moral claim of a central distributing institution, whether that is the state or a 
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commitment to private property. The tautology is clear when both of the following are 
held to be true at once: what is moral is determined by institution x; without 
institution x morality is impossible. Independently these are empirical claims and 
might be assessed as such, but in moral philosophy they are generally held together 
and apriori, hence the problem.  
To conclude this section, it is worth remarking that none of these three 
questions can be asked and answered in isolation from the other: each implies the 
other and numerous others. Rather, the point I am trying to make here is that there is 
no unique or Archimedean vantage point from which to adjudicate on the pressing 
questions of global ethics. This contingency and contextualism is not a regrettable 
irritation, it is fundamentally the generative motor of the problem of ethics itself. This 
context is also of such a highly complex and irreducible nature as to make it anarchic 
at its epistemological core. Defending anarchy is thus to defend the possibility of 
contingent, emergent and unpredictable outcomes, to defend the infinite ways in 
which we might realize the good in contingent communities, and to be open to an 
ontological anarchy, a fluid and emergent becoming.  
 
Contesting Anarchism  
 
It is an increasingly small portion of the left who today would reject these anti-
capitalist and anti-statist arguments completely. Rather, the rejection of anarchist 
politics on the left relates to the legitimacy of anarchist populism, the limits of 
anarchist practice, and the problem of scaling anarchy (see for example Srnicek and 
Williams 2015). These criticisms go to the heart of an anarchist account of global 
ethics, as I will show, and answering them is central to the future of anarchism as a 
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global ethics. The first is a tactical critique: what are the limits of protest politics and 
affinity groups? The second is a strategic critique: can anarchists afford to shun the 
established institutions of global power? The third is a philosophical critique of 
anarchist anti-representationalism: if not everyone can always be present, what are the 
legitimate grounds for an anarchist politics that aspires to be universal?  
The Occupy Wall Street movement was arguably the most identifiably 
anarchist global movement for social justice in recent times (Bray 2013, Graeber 
2013, Schneider 2013). Indeed, its anarchist credentials were as forcefully pressed by 
those who sought to criticise it, as those who sought to claim it as their own.  
For critics, the horizontalism and consensus decision making at the heart of 
anarchist politics and the Occupy movement is predicated on a misplaced 
individualism, an individualism which is effusive and generative, but essentially 
reactionary rather than proactive. The presupposition that each individual has a veto 
in consensus decision making, and that each individual brings with them a personal 
politics of identity or political grievance, means that the horizontality at the heart of 
the anarchistic Occupy Wall Street movement will forever render it a protest politics 
and nothing more. Individualism and a refusal to generate collective demands, is 
fundamentally at odds with the collectivism necessary to galvanise a political 
movement that can affect the changes the socialist ethics of anarchism demands 
(Dean 2016).  
 This critique is important to consider but it misses the central element of the 
Occupy movement almost completely. Not only does anarchism correctly foreground 
the individual both morally and politically, but so too, the means through which this 
takes place is the politics. As I will discuss further below, individuality is not given, 
but created through the community that precedes it. But to make that process of self-
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realisation democratic it must be participatory and non-dominating. We cannot lose 
the individual in a crowd as Dean (2016) would like, nor should we crowd source the 
general will. Rather, conscious direct participation and the tacit right of veto demands 
a political process that respects the dignity of each individual. The alternative is anti-
individualist, and the history of the communist left is hardly a glowing endorsement 
of this (Courtois 1999). 
Organisational criticisms of Occupy miss the protest for the politics. The 
anarchists of Occupy developed highly sophisticated institutional and decision 
making mechanisms, that were horizontal and sensitive to the power asymmetries that 
intersected within the movement. These included spokes councils, progressive stacks, 
the General Assembly and a vast number of committees, each designed to counter 
material, racial, gendered, and cultural power asymmetries. Each of these institutions 
checked one another, but also acted as the vehicle for developing a plural collective 
consciousness within an open, horizontal and participatory political institution. This 
anarchy at the heart of the institutional framework of Occupy was prefigurative of the 
anarchy to come, ensuring no single institution or collective voice was the final word, 
and rather than conflating the collective with the crowd, it rather disaggregated and 
institutionalised a plural consciousness. It was not the occupations themselves that 
were significant, but the attempt to develop a new means of organising politically, 
which has arguably come to dominate the non-mainstream left (Maiguashca, Dean 
and Keith 2016). 
The second critique of anarchist politics is the following: how can anarchists 
make a claim to the legitimacy of their activities and claims, when they have refused 
to speak on behalf of, let alone gain the formal support of, a recognisable public 
constituency? Far from being legitimate then, the exponential rise of NGOs, of 
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grassroots community activism and global civil society is evidence, critics argue, of 
the de-politicisation and the de-legitimisation of politics, for refusing to engage with 
the established institutions of the modern state. Moreover, and compounding this, the 
prevalence of either a universalist ethic of cosmopolitanism, or a poststructuralist 
suspicion of ethics tout court within the current anti-globalisation movement, makes it 
increasingly difficult to ground an ethical critique of anything at all (Chandler 2004a, 
b, Bickerton et al, 2006). The response, for these authors, is the revitalisation of the 
nation state, currently being hollowed out by neoliberalism, cosmopolitanism and 
anarchism, with a clear ethics aligned with democratically agreed political interests 
that can galvanise a new political subject.    
Building constituencies and developing a counter political economy is no 
doubt a key aspiration of the anarchist left too. But there is a problem with the notion 
of political subjectivity implied by this account of constituency, and that is that it 
totalises it, thereby making each conception of the people exclusionary. But this 
notion of a singular public is itself a chimera. Political subjectivity is indeterminate at 
its core, evoked or conjured epistemically, not objectively identifiable. While the 
attempt to reify or essentialise community for the purposes of politics may be 
expedient, it is hardly ethical if one such identity is taken to dominate the others, 
arbitrarily or otherwise. If what we value is the endless potential for becoming 
implied in a humanist or post-humanist politics, then anarchy of identity is also 
central here (Rossdale 2015).  
 Finally, drilling down further, how can anarchists scale their advances in terms 
of a new anarchist sensibility on the left, to develop a non-representational mass 
movement? Direct democracy is a privilege of scale and access. In other words, it is 
more likely you will be able to participate directly in the small gatherings you are able 
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to reach and have your voice heard. Large ones, or those at an inaccessible distance, 
will demand resources not available to most. In large gatherings, not everyone has the 
confidence to speak, while not everyone has the same resources to facilitate 
attendance. This is compounded in places like the World Social Forum, where mass 
gatherings often require inter-continental travel, and language and public speaking 
skills that many people lack. Anti-representational politics will cede this discursive 
ground to non-anarchists, while the privileging of presence will discount the 
legitimate claims of millions that cannot attend, but are happy to be represented by 
others (Teivainen 2016). 
This critique goes to the heart of the other two, and is one that anarchists will 
have to negotiate in order to avoid the trappings of elitism, vanguardism and the 
totalisation of political subjectivity. Put in other words, can we find ways of 
representing the views of others which are not dominating? The simple answer is no. 
The more complex answer is we must try. The process of vocalising, of writing and of 
communicating is itself a process of translation, in which my thought is imprecisely, 
stumblingly, made into something else. Self-expression, let alone communication 
with others demands, is always mediated, with meaning translated and retranslated, 
into new vernaculars. We do not have direct unmediated access to anything. As this 
process widens, with multiple interlocutors, meaning becomes more and more 
difficult to manage and to transmit. The process of translation itself is often mediated 
by tools, like computers, megaphones or instant messaging, but also via non-verbal 
communication. Representation is thus given in communication and translation is 
inevitable (Coleman 2015, Cohn 2006).  
But all acts of representation take place in epistemic communities, as well as 
material ones. These communities are themselves constituted by these process of 
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representation and communication. Whatever the distances or the modes of 
mediation, it is the process of communal retranslation in the name of the community 
that gives meaning to this cacophony. This does not undermine the anarchist critique 
of the state and modern society, it reinforces it and its palliative alternative. It is 
through maximising participation and flattening social hierarchies that representation 
can be open and dialogical, but also of value to communities. An anarchist politics 
cannot avoid representation, but it has the ethical tools, practices and institutional 
experiences to make representation anarchist again.  
 
Conclusion: anarchy revisited 
 
The account I have given here of the relation of anarchy to global ethics differs quite 
dramatically from that offered by Thomas Nagel at the outset. The state cannot 
deliver us from anarchy – anarchy is our lot, both epistemically and ontologically, let 
alone what happens in international relations. But this is no cause for dismay. 
Anarchy is also the crucible and benchmark of justice itself. This anarchy as absence 
of finality is the antithesis of much we take for granted in modern politics and ethics, 
particularly on the left, but also on the right. Sovereignty and private property, in so 
far as both are predicated on dominium, are antithetical to anarchy as I have described 
it here, and so unethical.   
 This alternative is predicated upon, or issues in an idea of justice as immanent 
to both the individual and society, with the antinomy between them constitutive of the 
phenomenology of justice. It sees political community as more immediate, but ethics 
as more expansive than possible through the institutions of modern liberal society. 
Anarchy, from this perspective, signifies the absence of finality, whether of authority, 
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of identity, or of justice. This anti-transcendentalist promise at the heart of an 
anarchist ethics suggests opens plural conceptions of the good, and of the proper 
institutional framework through which it might be realised. To that end, the praxis of 
prefiguration, participation and horizontality are key.  
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